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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

NICKERSON PUMP & MACHINERY
CO., INC.,
Plaintiff}
Case No.
9353

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF
Analysis demonstrates that Defendant's Brief (identified
herein as DB), is, in the main, beside the point. Specifically,
it embodies a tripartite tactic: ( 1) misidentification of plaintiff's position (embracing at one point a paraphrasing of a
' taxpayer's argument in an entirely different case), followed
by: (2) citation of authorities in no wise inconsistent with
plaintiff's true approach, followed by: ( 3) assertion (bulwarked by no discussion whatever of the largely stipulated and
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undisputed facts of record) that "there can be no question"
or " ( i) t is apparent" that plaintiff consumes the subject pump
assemblies 1 • The field thus littered with straw men, defendant
asks endorsement of the tax imposition under review.
The straw men so conjured represent, however, new issues
and necessitate reply. They are:
(A) That plaintiff, if not technically a "consumer", is
a "user" (DB, pp. 7-8); and
(B) That plaintiff, being a "contractor", 1s per se a
"consumer" (DB, pp. 6-12) .2
In an attempt to support its argument, defendant depends
to a considerable extent upon non-Utah decisions ( 13 of 16).
Because of plaintiff's equally great reliance upon Utah decisions
(15 of 18), defendant raises a third new issue. It is:
(C) That the Utah decisions cited by plaintiff "have
already been severely criticized by this Court" (DB, p. 2).
It is the purpose of this brief to demonstrate the impropriety of the defendant's arguments. Additionally, attention
shall be paid defendant's concession of error (DB, p. 2) with
respect to Points II and III of Plaintiff's Brief.
tSometimes called pumps herein and in Plaintiff's Brief (PB).
2Plaintiff will not attempt to deal with another possible new issue
through untangling the process by which defendant seizes upon a
footnote (PB, p. 14), elevates it to the status of a contention, adds
some purported implications to it, and then concludes that plaintiff
is begging the question (DB, pp. 4-5). Suffice it to say that defendant
seems to agree with plaintiff that the assembly of pumps is not in
itself a taxable act, and that the issue is whether the emplacement of
the pumps thus assembled constitutes plaintiff a consumer (PB, pp.
13-14; DB, p. 2).

4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff controverts defendant's addendum to plaintiffs
statement of facts.
1. The pump assemblies are not "specifically engineered
for the particular need involved" if, by this, defendant means
that each pump is specifically suitable for one well and no
other. The uncontradicted testimony was that a given well
can receive various pumps and that a given pump can fit various
wells. Pumps are exchanged between different wells, are
traded in, and are resold (R. 53-54, 56, 67, 71-72, 74, 95).
2. Defendant's enumeration of the items included
lump sum contract is misleading in that:

111

a

(A) The first four items listed are not different in kind,
but rather are all parts of a deep well line shaft assembly
or, more shortly put, deep well line shaft pump sold by plaintiff
(R. 49, 113).
(B) Two other types of pump assemblies, with different
component parts, sold by plaintiff are involved: submersible
deep well pumps and booster pumps (R. 47).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. PLAINTIFF IS NOT A "USER".
2. PLAINTIFF IS NOT A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR.

3. UTAH DECISIONS SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S POSITION.

5
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4. DEFENDANT'S CONCESSION OF ERROR REQUIRES, AT THE LEAST, MODIFICATION OF THE
DECISION UNDER REVIEW.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT A "USER".
Defendant would have the Court believe that it is plaintiff's
view that "consume" must be given a "narrow definition",
to-wit: "to destroy", "to use up" and "to expend". While
such may have been the argument of the taxpayer in the case
from which defendant lifted, with minimal paraphrasing, its
language on this point, f. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga.
App. 583, 80 S.E. 2d 86, 87-88 (1954), it most certainly is
not plaintiff's contention herein.
Plaintiff's position (explained with care in DB, pp. 14-20)
is this: ( 1) three Utah decisions define the term "consumer",
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87
Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 (1935); Utah Concrete Products Corp.
v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P. 2d 408 (1942);
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110
Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 (1946); (2) under such definitions,
and each of them, plaintiff is not-on the basis of the undisputed facts of record 3-a consumer. While plaintiff is
3Defendant, after setting forth its preferred definitions, (understandably) does not apply them to the facts of record. Rather it sets
forth tests in isolation, then jumps to a conclusion that plaintiff's
business meets such tests. Contrast plaintiff's extensive discussion of
the applicable undisputed facts (PB 16-20, 33-35). Defendant's

6
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somewhat concerned, abstractly, with defendant's assertion
that Utah Concrete Products Corp. established a "liberal"·i
definition for the term "consumer", the fact remains that plaintiff (at PB, pp. 15-16, 18-19) dealt with such definition
("liberal", "conservative", "broad", "narrow" or whatever)
and demonstrated that plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of
Sales and Use Tax liability as therein delineated.
Nor is plaintiff a "user" within the meaning of the definitions and out-state decisions preferred by defendant. A
user is one whose use of a given article is the "ultimate use
to which all intermediate ones lead", Albuquerque Lumber
Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 41 N.M. 58, 75 P. 2d 334, 338
(1938); the ultimate use and employment of the pumps in
question is to pump water, and plaintiff does not do so. Plaintiff
does not diminish or destroy the utility of the pumps; rather,
through emplacement, it activates their utility; nor does plaintift
keep and enjoy the presence or prospect of the pumps. If, as
stated in f. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, supra, "consumption
means using things, and production means adapting them for
use" (DB, p. 8), and the two are contradistrict, it seems quite
obvious that plaintiff's emplacement of pumps constitutes an
"adaptation for use" and, hence, is not a taxable act as consumption.
attention is directed to the language, at 80 S.E. 2d 89, of its mentor,
the Georgia Court of Appeals:
"It is what happened and not what might have happened that
determines legal consequences in a case such as this . . . This
court has no choice but to treat with the legal consequences demanded by the facts as the parties made them."
4 For

tax statutes are not construed liberally in favor of the State; they
are construed strictly against it, Pacific Intermottntain Express Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650, 651 (1958).

7
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II.
PLAlNTlFl; IS NOT A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR.
Defendant, citing State v. f. Watts Kearney & Sons, 181
La. 554, 160 So. 77 ( 1934), proclaims that " ( s) ales to contractors are sales to consumers . . ."; therefore apparently
concludes that since plaintiff admittedly enters into contracts
(both with private and public buyers, both lump-sum and
non lump-sum), it is a consumer.
On its face, defendant's contention is untenable. All
persons selling under contracts of sale and emplacement are
not "users" or "consumers." Defendant's own regulations
recognize this (PB 25-27). So do the cases that defendant
cites. Each deals with construction contractors or subcontractors
who were found, under the facts, to have consumed materials
used in the building of a structure, i.e., to have been "the last
persons in the chain to deal with such products before incorporation into a separate entity and before such products lost
their identity as such ... ", Utah Concrete Products Corp. 5
5Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, (heating and
general contractors) ;Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 624,
194 SE 117 (1937) (plumbing and heating contractors); City of St.
Louis v. Smith, 342 1\fo. 317, 114 SW 2d 1017 (1938) (paving,
sewer and hospital contractors-how this case demonstrates that the
pump assemblies herein lose their identity or are incorporated into a
separate entity-DB, p. 9--escapes plaintiff); Craftsman Painters &
Decorators v. Carpenter, Ill Colo. 1, 137 P.2d 414 (1942) (painting
and electrical contractors); Duhame v. State Tax Comm., 65 Ariz.
268, 179 P.2d 252, 171 ALR 684 (1947) (building contractor);
Harding v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 275 P.2d 264 (Okla., 1954)
(masonry contractor); Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, 367
Ill. 60, 12 NE 638, 115 ALR 491 (1938) (sewer and tunnel contractors); f. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, supra (building contractor);

8
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As stated in

J.

Watts Kearney, at 160 So. 78:

"A contractor who buys material is not one who buys
and sells-a trader. He is not a dealer, or one who
habitually and constantly, as a business, deals in and
sells any given commodity. He does not sell lime and
cement and nails and lumber.
''His work is to deliver to his obligee some work or
edifice or structure, the construction of which requires
the application of skill and labor to these materials
so that, when he finishes his task, the materials purchased are no longer to be distinguished, but something different has been wrought from their use and
union. The contractor has not resold but has consumed
the materials."
Plaintiff need not impeach defendant's cases, for despite
defendant's bare assertion to the contrary, (DB, p. 12), plaintiff
is not a construction contractor. Plaintiff does no construction
work whatever. Prior to the emplacement of deep well pump
assemblies, the buyer, acting individually or through an independent contractor other than plaintiff, digs the water well
and lines it with casing (R. 4 7, 49, 78-79) . The buyer, not
plaintiff, also builds a concrete foundation around the mouth
of the well and builds a water line extending toward the
pump (R. 47-48, 81-82}. Plaintiff does sell pump assemblies,
doing so habitually and constantly, as a business. Its task is not
to deliver to its obligee some work or edifice or structure. It
Lone Star Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 465, 179
So. 399 (1937) (general contractor); State v. Christhilf, 170 Md.
586, 185 A. 456 (1936) (road and building contractors); State v.
f. Watts Kearney & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934) (building
contractor); Volk v. Evatt, 142 Ohio App. 335, 52 NE 2d 338 (1943)
(heating contractor) ; York Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Flannary, 87
Pa. Super. 19 ( 1926) (heating contractor).

9
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merely delivers and emplaces the pump assembly. After its
work is ·completed, the pump assembly delivered remains
distinguishable as such.
A construction contractor, being a consumer in fact, is
subject to tax on such consumption whether accomplished
under lump-sum or non lump-sum contracts, J. W. lvleadorJ
& Co. v. State, supra. Equally, one who delivers and emplaces
machinery which-after emplacement-retains its identity is
not a consumer, whether or not a lump-sum contract is used,
General Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 180, 244 P. 2d 427 ( 1953). The latter case is
particularly important for, therein, the sale, delivery and
emplacement of a very expensive, multi-ton machine was held
not to constitute use or consumption, although the facts
established that-unlike the pump assemblies here involved
(PB 33-35 )-such machine was a fixture.
Construction contractors may be consumers. Plaintiff is not.

III.
UTAH DECISIONS SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S POSITION.
Defendant does not, in its brief, offer any support for its
charge that the Utah decisions relied upon by plaintiff "have
already been severely criticized by this Court". Perhaps it
should be disregarded, therefore, as a mere random scoff. Since
it implies intellectual dishonesty on the part of plaintiff, however, attention will be paid it.
Plaintiff has rechecked Shepat'd's Utah Citator, induding
supplement, and examined the cases there listed. It is found
that:

10
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( 1) Western Leather & Finding Co. was criticized by
the author Justice and disapproved by another Justice in Utah
Concrete Products Corp. Its definition of "consumer", however, was cited approvingly in a later decision, Union Portland
Cement Co., authored by the same Justice as Utah Concrete

Products Corp.
(2} Union Portland Cement Co. was modified on rehearing, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 ( 1947), but on a point
entirely separate from its definition of "consumer".

Plaintiff finds no other criticism (severe or otherwise)
by this Court of plaintiff's authorities on the points for which
citation was made.
As has been noted (and despite defendant's seeming
desire to abridge away at plaintiff's argument), plaintiff has
not wedded itself to any one definition of "consumer" found
in the three Utah decisions in point. Plaintiff is inclined to
the view that they complement one another and has demonstrated that, under each of them, it is not a consumer.
IV.
DEFENDANT'S CONCESSION OF ERROR REQUIRES,
AT THE LEAST, MODIFICATION OF THE DECISION
UNDER REVIEW.
Plaintiff appreciates defendant's candid (if belated6 )
stipulation and concession that "the penalties mentioned in
6And,

to plaintiff, expensive: to-wit, six pages of plaintiff's brief
(actual Salt Lake Times expenditure: $9.60; allowable cost: $7.50,
U.~·F:·P. 7.5 (p) (4)) and $544.65 of the $2,728.56 deposited by
platnttff wtth defendant on October 11, 1960 (the use of which
plaintiff has lost until performance of the Court's mandate herein).
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petitioner's (i.e. plaintiffs) Point II were improperly assessed
and that its Point III is valid" (DB, p. 2). At least three consequences follow: ( 1) it renders harmless defendant's misstatement (DB, p. 2) that plaintiff concedes that it is "subject
to the sales or ( sicJ) use tax as assessed" 8 if plaintiff "is
found to be the consumer of the pump assemblies in question".
For plaintiff concedes nothing of the sort. Both such Points
II and III, of course, explicitly prayed reversal regardless of
the eventual resolution of the "consumer" issue. (PB, pp. 3942) ; ( 2) the final sentence of defendant's brief that " ( t) he
decision of the Tax Commission should be affirmed" (DB,
p. 13) is miswritten; to the extent that the assessment included
penalties (Point II) and items disputed in Point III, defendant
"concedes and stipulates" the error of its affirmance of Auditor
Buttalph's deficiency assessment; (3) in terms of dollars and
cents, defendant admits by its concession that, even if it prevails on the "consumer" issue, it should return to plaintiff
$544.65. 9

CONCLUSION

If defendant's view of plaintiff as a consumer is correct,
the assessment must be modified as specified in Point IV herein.
Defendant's view, however, is not correct. Plaintiff, in
7The instant deficiency assessment includes both a sales tax portion
and a use tax portion. The Code likewise itemizes the taxes separately. Defendant should, therefore, have used the conjunctive "and"
rather than the disjunctive "or."
SEmphasis supplied.
9 A tabulation of the ~eficiency amount owing as of payment, if the
concededly erroneous Items are deleted, constitutes Exhibit A hereto.
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the subject transactions, was not a consumer (or user) either
in fact or in law. Accordingly, the tax imposition should be
vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
Kent Shearer
Earl M. Wunderli
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A
Schedule A
RESUME' OF ASSESSMENT MODIFICATIONS OCCASIONED BY DEFENDANT'S CONCESSION OF THE
VALIDITY OF POINTS II AND III OF
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
A. Point II: Elimination of penalties and reduction of interest
on deficiencies to six percent per annum.

B. Point III:
Sub point 1: ( 1) Reduction of the amount listed at line
1, Schedule 4, page 2 to $2,693.08.

( 2) Reduction of the amount listed at line
2 of the 1959 portion of Schedule 4, page 4 to $987.36.
Subpoint 2: Elimination of the item listed at line 9,
Schedule 4, page 2 (amount: $620.03).
Subpoint 3: Rendered moot by defendant's concession of
plaintiff's Point II.
Sub point 4: ( 1) Elimination of the item listed at line 7,
Schedule 4, page 3 (amount: $781.76).
( 2) Elimination of the item listed at line 1,

1959 portion of Schedule 4, page 4 (amount: $4,563.48).10
( 3) Elimination of the item listed at line 4,
1959 portion of Schedule 4, page 4 (amount: $111.37). 10
IOThese items have not been eliminated from the use tax adjustments
hereafter. Inasmuch as the sales tax statute of limitations has not run
on them, they should be considered, if defendant is considered a
consumer, as delinquent sales tax payments.

14
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( 4) Elimination of the items listed at lines
7 and 8, 1959 portion of Schedule 4, page 4 (amount:
$216.36) .10
( 5) Elimination of the item listed at line
11, 1959 portion of Schedule 4, page 4 (amount $390.00) .10

Schedule B
RESUME' OF CONSEQUENT ADJUSTMENTS IN
EXHIBIT A OF AMENDED SUMMARY OF SALES
TAX ADJUSTMENTS
Adjusted
Total
( 1) 1956: elimination of penalty and reduction
of interest to 6% per annum on $4.84
from 12-15-56 to 10-11-60 ( interst11
total: $1.15).
$
5.99
( 2) 195 7: elimination of penalty and reduction
of interest to 6% per annum on $133.44
from 9-15-5 7 to 10-11-60 (interest total: $24.62).

158.06

( 3) 19 58: elimination of penalty and reduction
of interest to 6% per annum on $22.49
from 9-15-58 to 10-11-60 (interest
total: $2.80).

25.29

Total Sales Tax Due on 10-11-60

$ 189.34

11 All interest has been computed from Coffin's Interest Tables (Winston
Company, 1946).
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Schedule C
RESUME' OF CONSEQUENT ADJUSTMENTS IN
EXHIBIT B OF AMENDED SUMMARY OF
USE TAX ADJUSTMENTS
Adjusted
Total
( l) 19 55 : elimination of penalty and reduction
of interest to 6% per annum on $329.16
from 12-15-55 to 10-11-60 (interest
$ 426.10
total $96.94).
( 2) 1956: reduction of principal to $421.39,
elimination of penalty and reduction
of interest to 6% per annum on $421.39
from 9-15-56 to 10-11-60 (interest
total: $103.00).
524.39
( 3) 195 7: reduction of principal to $342.07,
elimination of penalty and reduction of
mterest to 6% per annum on $342.07
from 9-15-57 to 10-11-60 (interest
total: $6 3.11 ) .
405.18
( 4) 1959: elimination of penalty and reduction of
interest to 6% per annum on $591.94
from 6-15-59 to 10-11-60 (interest
total: $46.96).
638.90
Total Use Tax Due on 10-11-60
$1,994.57
ScheduleD
COMPUTATION OF AMOUNT
CONCEDED BY DEFENDANT
TO BE IMPROPERLY COLLECTED

( 1) Amount of Tax and Interest Collected 10-11-60: $2,728.56
(2) Amount of Tax and Interest Defendant Now
Claims, Computed as of 10-11-60:
(3) Amount of Tax and Interest Erroneously
Collected:

2,183.91

$ 544.65
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